Abstract
I. Introduction
In recent years the impact of the inflow of foreign capital on welfare has been examined by many authors in the context of international trade. Two fundamental questions have been raised in this literature. First, what is the welfare impact of foreign capital inflow under a laissez faire regim e.1 Sec ond, what is the impact of a tariff induced capital inflow on welfare.2 It has been shown that in this context capital inflow may be welfare reducing. This paper departs from the Heckscher-Ohlin framework where there is usually only one representative agent whose welfare is considered. There are many instances where many agents exist in an economy and whose welfare can not be necessarily represented by an aggregate utility function. We utilise a trade theoretic framework to analyse the impact of an inflow of foreign capi tal on regional welfare, in particular, urban and rural incomes. This distinc-1. A large number of papers have been written on these issues. For example, Beladi and Marjit [1992] , Bhagwati and Brecher [1981] , Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro [1987] , Hatzipanoyatou and Michel [1992] , Brecher and Findlay [1983] and Jones [1984】 . 2 . Some countries in fact institutionalise this conflict by having political parties repre senting regions. For example the Australian National party is essentially a ruralbased party. The model could also be applied to conflict among States where the consumption patterns vary across States. In the Canadian context, the presence of different linguistic groups and cultures leads to regional conflict. The outcome of the current Indian elections is a good example of the influences of regional parties in national outcomes.
tion between ru ral and urban incom es is im p o rta n t in policy m aking in many countries.3
The urban and rural regions are distinguished from each other in terms of both production and consum ption. Two goods are produced in each region. The urban sector produces an im portable good and an urban nontraded good. This non-traded commodity is not consumed by the rural pop ulation. The rural region produces the exportable good and a rural non-traded good w hich is not consumed by the urban population. The representative consumer in the urban and rural regions thus consume a different bundle of goods: the urban agent consumes two traded and the urban non-traded goods while the rural agent consumes the same traded goods and the rural non-traded good.4 Urban non-traded goods are m ainly consum ed by the urban population.
Several interesting results regarding the interrelationship between foreign capital and regional incomes are obtained. First, it is established that foreign capital inflow (both exogenous and endogenous) necessarily 'immiserizes' the rural region provided that the production of the importable good is more capital intensive than the urban non-traded good. The urban region necessar ily gains from an inflow of exogenous foreign capital in aggregate terms but not necessarily in per capita terms under the same capital intensity condi tion. However, the urban region may gain or lose both aggregate and per capita real income as a consequence of endogenous capital inflow induced by a change in the terms-of-trade. We also show th at both regions may be 'immiserized' by an endogenous inflow of capital. These results extend the theory of immiserizing growth and foreign capital to regional economics.5
II. A Trade Model for Regional Analysis with Foreign Capital
Four goods: X Uf X N， X r and X Nr are produced w ith neoclassical production fu n c tio n s w h ic h possesses co nstant re tu rn s to scale and d im in is h in g 3. This distinction was originally made in Hazari and Sgro [1991] , [1992] . 4. These results are related to Hazari and Sgro [1996] where a model of regional devel opment has been analyzed without foreign and region specific capital. 5. Alternatively agents in both regions could share the repatriation payments to foreign capital. This would not effect the results qualitatively.
returns to factors. The goods X v and X N are produced in the urban region with the help of region specific capital (domestic and foreign) and labour.
The commodity, X Uf is traded both domestically and internationally while good, X N, (the non-traded good) is produced and consumed in the urban region only. The employment structure for the urban area is given below: 
The terms w and r denote the wage rate and rental on domestic and foreign capital.
The competitive pricing equations for the urban region are:
where, Pw is the exogenously given relative price of the urban traded good, PNy the endogenously determ ined relative price of the urban non-traded good.
The market for urban non-traded good clears locally in the urban region only. Hence demand equals supply:
where I u denotes urban income. The urban real income is defined below:
On the consumption side: Duu and D Ur, represent the consumption of the goods X v and X r in the urban area. The term rKF represents the total return to foreign capital w hich is fully repatriated and paid for by the urban sector.5
Note that the price of the rural traded goods has been set equal to unity as this price is used as the numeraire for the model.
In the rural region the goods X r and X Nr are produced w ith the region spe c if ic rural capital and labour with neoclassical production factors w hich pos sess constant returns to scale and dim inishing return to factors. The com modity, X r, is traded both domestically and internationally. The employment structure for the rural region is given below:
where K R is the inelastically supplied quantity of rural capital and E R the en dogenously determined am ount of aggregate rural employment. The rural a^-s are the variable input coefficients and are functions of factor prices as shown below:
where R is the return to rural capital. No foreign capital is used in the rural region. Labour is completely mobile between sectors and regions hence the full employment condition is given below:
where L is the inelastically supplied quantity of total labour .
The competitive pricing structure for the rural region is given below:
where Pr is the exogenously given price of the good, X r ， and is chosen as the numeraire and set equal to unity. The relative price of the non-traded good, PNr， is endogenously determined.
The market for rural non-traded good clears locally in the rural region only, hence demand equals supply:
where I R denotes real income in the rural region as shown below.
-PuDru + D n + PNrD Nr = X r + PNrX Nr (15) where D rU and D n represent rural consumption of the urban and rural trad ed good respectively.
The market clearing equations ior X v and X r, the traded goods are given below:
where M represents imports and E exports.
W hen K F is treated as an endogenous variable its flow can be a function of several variables. However, for analytical convenience it is assumed to be a function of Pv as shown below:6
It is assumed that, X Uf is the most capital intensive good in the economy, 
Equations (1 9 ) to (22) provide the supply functions for the four goods. Note that the supply functions also depend on the regional allocation of labour.
6. The flow of capital in some models in tariff-induced. These results can be rederived for the tariff-induced case, but would merely add complexity without adding any thing new to the main insights of this paper. 7. Alternatively, the supply functions could be obtained by using duality theory.
III. Results
In this section we first analyse the effect of an exogenous increase in for eign capital on outputs, employment and most importantly regional welfare (income). From equations (4), (5), (12), and (13) 
P ro p o s itio n l : A n increase in foreign capital inflow necessarily raises the rel ative price o f the urban and rural non-traded goods provided that ku > kN and kr > kNr. From the Stolper-Samuelson theorem it follows that w rises and the return to capital in both regions falls. P r o p o s itio n 2 : A n increase in foreign capital inflow necessarily increases urban income (welfare) an d lower ru ra l income (welfare) provided that ku > k Nand kr > kNr.
It is clear from Proposition 2 that an inflow of foreign capital raises urban income and lowers rural income provided the factor intensity conditions are satisfied. The intuitive explanation of this result is contained in Proposition 1 and is developed in terms of Figure 1 . Since both regions use labour the rela tive price of the urban and rural non-traded goods are related to each other via the factor intensity conditions. The real incom e effect of these price changes on factor rewards are different in the two regions due to non-identi cal consumption baskets. Proposition 1 shows that the rental on rural capital necessarily falls as a consequence of foreign capital inflow. This decline caus es a fall in the real income of the rural region. Urban capital rental also falls but is compensated by the benefit of receiving foreign capital and labour from the rural region -leading to an increase in urban income.
A variant of the box diagram is used to present the above results. The dia gram exploits the concept of sectoral factor em ploym ent vectors for the urban region and isoquants for the rural region. In Figure 1 (26) and (27) th at the urban region gains more than the rural region. Hence, the rural region may be compensated by a suitable policy. This result is in keeping with the Pare to Rule.
We now proceed to examine the effect of a change in the terms of trade on regional incomes assum ing the endogeneity of foreign capital. By differ entiating the regional income equations (7) and (15) Note th at in this m odel both regions real incom e changes due to the m igration of labour and changes in relative prices for non-traded goods. We shall assume that the m igration is a function of foreign capital which in turn depends on Pv. This function for the urban region is given below:
It is assumed that:
This states that labour follows capital.
The expression for the change in the rental on capital is obtained by as sum ing that PN is initially constant,8 hence by differentiating equating (4) and (5) we obtain:
From equation (29) and (30) 
IV. Conclusion
This paper clearly shows the difference between the impact of exogenous vis-a-vis endogenous inflow of foreign capital on regional income (welfare).
Given the structure of our model the region that does not receive foreign capital is always im m iserized for the intensities we have assumed. In the urban region the results are not as clear cut. An exogenous inflow of foreign capital increases urban welfare, however, an endogenous inflow may in crease or lower urban welfare. These results provide insights for targeting the inflow of foreign capital.
